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Abstract
In a batch program, information about conﬁdential inputs may ﬂow to insecure outputs. The size of this
leakage, considered as a Shannon measure, may be automatically and exactly calculated via probabilistic
semantics as we have shown in our earlier work. This approach works well for small programs with small
state spaces. As the scale increases the calculation suﬀers from a form of state space explosion and the time
complexity grows. In this paper we scale up the programs and state spaces that can be handled albeit at
the cost of replacing an exact result with an upper bound. To do this we introduce abstraction on the state
space via interval-based partitions, adapting an abstract interpretation framework introduced by Monniaux.
The user can deﬁne the partitions and the more coarse the partitions, the more coarse the resulting upper
bound. In this paper we summarise our previous contribution, deﬁne the abstract interpretation, show its
soundness, and prove that the result of an abstract computation is always an upper bound on the true
leakage, i.e. is a safe estimate. Finally we illustrate the approach by means of some examples.
Keywords: Security, Abstraction, Information Flow, Measurement, Language
1 Introduction
Information-ﬂow security enforces limits on the use of information propagation in
programs. The goal of information ﬂow security is to ensure that the information
propagates throughout the execution environment without security violations so
that no secure information is leaked to public outputs. The traditional theory based
reasoning and analysis of software systems are not concerned with security mea-
surement. Quantitative information ﬂow (QIF) proposes to determine how much
information ﬂows from conﬁdential inputs to public outputs. It is concerned with
measuring the amount of information ﬂow caused by interference between variables
by using information theoretic quantities. Quantitative analysis therefore relaxes
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the well known non-interference [14] property by introducing a new policy: the pro-
gram is secure if the amount of information ﬂow from conﬁdential inputs to public
outputs is not too big.
In [26], we presented an automatic analyzer for measuring information ﬂow
within software systems. We considered the mutual information between a high
security variable at the beginning of a batch program and a low one at the end of
the program, conditioned on the initial values of low, as the measure of how much
of the initial secret information is leaked by executing the program [4]. We incor-
porated the leakage computation into Kozen’s probabilistic semantics to build an
automatic analysis tool. This provided a more precise analysis. It took as input a
probability distribution on the initial store and calculated a probability distribution
on the ﬁnal store when the program sometimes terminates. In fact it calculates a
probability distribution at each program point. These can then be used to calculate
the exact leakage. Speciﬁcally, while-loops were handled by applying the more gen-
eral deﬁnition of entropy of generalized distributions [27] and related properties in
order to provide a more precise analysis when incorporating elapsed observed time
into the analysis. The drawback of this approach is that it is lacking in abstraction
techniques, and time complexity can become large in certain circumstances. One
of the time complexity issues is from mutual information computation [26]. An-
other one is introduced by applying concrete semantics to while loop, which can be
improved by applying the abstraction considered in this paper.
We introduce here an approximation method based on measurable partitions
and Monniaux’s abstract probabilistic semantics [25]. We deﬁne a basic abstract
domain using interval-based partitions with weights to abstract the measure space.
We then deﬁne abstract semantic functions which transform the abstract state space
in the abstract domain. The deﬁnition of leakage upper bound due to such seman-
tics is presented. We introduce uniformalization to provide upper bounds on the
leakage computation in the framework of information theory. The security property
we consider is an a priori bound on leakage, that is, the program is regarded as
suﬃciently secure if the leakage is less than the a priori bound. Since the actual
leakage in the program is required to be less than or equal to the a priori bound,
the analysis is safe if we ﬁnd an upper bound on the leakage [4].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the concrete
semantics and leakage computation used in our earlier work. In Section 3, we present
a method to approximate our concrete leakage analysis and prove some properties
of this. Finally, we present related work and draw conclusions in Section 4 and 5.
2 Leakage Analysis via Probabilistic Semantics
We have developed an automatic leakage analysis system in [26] without abstraction.
This previous work is summarized here for the sake of clarity.
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2.1 Measure space and programs
Assume that the tuple of program variables X range over the state space Ω. The
denotational semantics of a command is a mapping from the set X of possible
environments before a command into the set X ′ of possible environments after the
command. These spaces updated by semantic transformation functions, can be used
to calculate leakage at each program point. Some useful deﬁnitions from [30] are
reviewed as follows. A measure space is a triple (Ω,B, μ), where Ω is a set, B is a
σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, μ is a nonnegative, countably ﬁnite additive set function
on B. A σ-algebra is a set of subsets of a set X that contains ∅, and is stable under
countable union and complementation. A set X with a σ-algebra σX deﬁned on it
is called a measurable space and the elements of the σ-algebra are the measurable
subsets. If X and X ′ are measurable spaces, f : X → X ′ is a measurable function
if for all W measurable in X ′, f−1(W ) is measurable in X. A positive measure is
a function μ deﬁned on a σ-algebra σX , which is countable additive, i.e. if taking
(En)n∈N a disjoint collection of elements of σX , then μ(
⋃∞
n=0 En) =
∑∞
n=0 μ(En).
A probability measure is a positive measure of total weight 1. A sub-probability
measure has total weight less than or equal to 1.
2.2 The language
The language we considered is standard, presented in Table 1.
c ∈ Cmd x ∈ Var e ∈ Exp b ∈ BExp n ∈ Num
c ::= skip|x := e|c1; c2|if b then c1 else c2|while b do c
e ::= x|n|e1 + e2|e1 − e2|e1 ∗ e2|e1/e2
b ::= ¬b|e1 < e2|e1 ≤ e2|e1 = e2
Table 1
The language
2.3 Probabilistic semantics and leakage computation
In [26], we used Kozen’s probabilistic semantics for a while language [17] to calculate
the probability distribution on the ﬁnal state from knowledge of the initial state.
We then used this to calculate the quantity of leakage from any initial variable to
any ﬁnal variable.
Information theory introduced the deﬁnition of entropy, H, to measure the av-
erage uncertainty in random variables. Shannon’s measures were based on a loga-
rithmic measure of the unexpectedness of a probabilistic event (random variable).
The unexpectedness of an event which occurred with some non-zero probability p
was log2
1
p
. Hence the total information carried by a set of events was computed
as the weighted sum of their unexpectedness: H =
∑n
i=1 pi log2
1
pi
. Assume we
have two types of input variables: H(conﬁdential) and L(public), and the inputs
are equipped with probability distributions, so the inputs can be viewed as a joint
C. Mu, D. Clark / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 253 (2009) 119–141 121
random variable (H, L). The semantic function for programs maps the state of
inputs to the state of outputs. We present the basic leakage deﬁnition due to Clark,
Hunt and Malacaria [4] for programs as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Leakage) Let H be a random variable in high security inputs, L
be one in low security inputs, and let L′ be a random variable in the output ob-
servation, the secure information ﬂow (or interference) is deﬁned by I(L′;H|L),
i.e. the conditional mutual information between the output and the high input
given knowledge of the low output. Note that for deterministic programs, we have
I(L′;H|L) = H(L′|L), i.e. interference between the uncertainty in the public output
given knowledge of the low input.
The denotational semantics for measure space transformations are in the follow-
ing forms:
V al  〈Ω,B, μ〉 Σ  X → V al
C[[·]] : Cmd→ (Σ → Σ) E[[·]] : Exp→ (Σ → Val)
B[[·]] : BExp→ (Σ → Σ)
Consider the program as a state-transformation machine, and assume that the
tuple of program variables X range over the state space Ω. The program variables
X satisfy some joint distribution μ on program inputs: μ( X) assigned to each
X ∈ Ω; μ( X) ≥ 0;
∑
X∈Ω μ(
X) = 1. Let [[·]] denote any measure space transformer
given by a semantic function, precisely, [[·]] means [[CB]] where CB ∈ Cmd ∪ BExp, i.e.
[[·]] : Σ→ Σ′. In Kozen’s probabilistic semantics, a program transformation function
[[·]] maps distributions μ on X to distributions μ′ = [[·]](μ) on X . Let X ranges over
Ω in Σ, X ′ ranges over Ω in Σ′, μ is in Σ, and μ′ is in Σ′, i.e. X and X ′ denote the
measure space over X before and after [[·]]. Consider the general form of an action
of one elementary operator:
• X → (X ′ = [[·]](X))
• μ → μ′
• μ′(X ′) =
∑
X∈Ω μ(X)δX′, [[·]](X) where,
⎧⎨
⎩
δa,b = 1 iﬀ a = b
δa,b = 0 iﬀ a = b
We concentrate on the distributions and present the space transformation functions
oﬀered by semantic functions by using Lambda Calculus and the notation of inverse
function following [25] in Table 2.
Due to the measurability of the semantic functions, for all measurable W ∈ X ′,
[[x := e]](W ) is measurable in X. The function [[B]] for boolean test B deﬁnes the set
of environments matched by the condition B: [[B]](μ) = λX.μ(X ∩B), which causes
the space to split apart, X∩B denotes the part of the space X which makes boolean
test B to be true. Conditional statement is executed on the conditional probability
distributions for either the true branch or false branch: [[c1]]◦ [[b]](μ)+[[c2]]◦ [[¬b]](μ).
In the while loop, the measure space with distribution μ goes around the loop, and
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at each iteration, the part that makes test b false breaks oﬀ and exits the loop, while
the rest of the space goes around again. The output distribution [[while b do c]](μ)
is thus the sum of all the partitions that ﬁnally ﬁnd their way out. Note that these
partitions are part of the space when the loop partially terminates, which implies
the outputs are partially observable and hence produce an incomplete distribution.
The incomplete distribution incorporates the non-termination part (the rest of the
space) to be a complete distribution ﬁnally. For the case that the loop is always
non-terminating, ⊥ is returned and leakage is 0.
In what follows we present some of concrete semantic operations with leakage
analysis.
• Assignment Assignment updates the state such that the measure space of as-
signed variable x is updated to become the measure space for expression e. For
example, if there is no low input, the secure information leaked to low security
variable x after command [[x := e]] is give by L[[x:=e]] = H(μe). The secure infor-
mation contained in e is considered as the entropy of its distribution μe.
• Sequential composition command The distribution transformation function
for the sequential composition operator is obtained via functional composition:
[[c1; c2]](μ) = [[c2]] ◦ [[c1]](μ).
• Conditionals Conditional tests cause a partition of the measure space into values
that make the boolean b true and those that make it false: let [[b]]s denote the
standard state transformer of boolean test, P0 ⊆ X,∀x ∈ P0, [[b]]sx = tt, i.e. k
makes test b be true; P1 ⊆ X,∀x ∈ P1, [[b]]sx = ff, i.e. k makes test b be false, and
P0 ∪P1 = X ∧P0∩P1 = ∅. Let μb(tt) =
∑
x∈P0
μ(x) denote the probability that
b is true, and μb(ff) =
∑
x∈P1
μ(x) denote the probability that b is false under
the current space. Let P0 = {p0 = μb(tt)}, P1 = {p1 = μb(ff)} denote the
partitions due to the test b, and Ql0 = {q00, . . . , q0m}, Q
l
1 = {q10, . . . , q1n} denote
the normalized distribution of the low security variable l inside the partitions.
The semantic function is given by [[if b then c1 else c2]](μ) = [[c1]] ◦ [[b]](μ) +
[[c2]] ◦ [[¬b]](μ). The leakage into l due to the if statement can be computed by:
L[[if]] = H˜(P0 ∪ P1) + H˜(Q
l
0 ∪Q
l
1 | P0 ∪ P1)
where H˜ denotes the entropy of generalised distributions [26].
Example 2.2 To show how the method works, let us consider a simple program
[[x := e]](μ)  λW.μ([[x := e]]−1(W ))
[[c1; c2]](μ)  [[c2]] ◦ [[c1]](μ)
[[if b then c1 else c2]](μ)  [[c1]] ◦ [[b]](μ) + [[c2]] ◦ [[¬b]](μ)
[[while b do c]](μ)  [[¬b]](limn→∞(λμ
′.μ + [[c]] ◦ [[b]](μ′))n)(λX.⊥))
where, [[B]](μ) = λX.μ(X ∩B)
Table 2
Probabilistic Denotational Semantics of Programs
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[26].
if (h==0) then l=0 else l=1;
Assume h is a 32-bit high security variable with possible values 0, . . . , sk − 1
under uniform distribution, l is a low security variable. The boolean test splits
the original space and we get P0 = {
1
232
}, P1 = {1 −
1
232
}, and Ql0 = {μl(0)} =
{ 1232 }, Q
l
1 = {μl(1)} = {1−
1
232 }. The resulting set of distribution transformation
is obtained as:
[[if]]
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝〈h, l〉 →
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
〈0,⊥〉 → 1/232
. . . . . .
〈232 − 1,⊥〉 → 1/232
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠=
⎛
⎝l →
⎡
⎣ 0 → 1/232
1 → 1− 1/232
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
The distribution of low security variable l after the execution of the program is as
follows: l →
⎡
⎣ 0 → 1/232
1 → 1− 1/232
⎤
⎦, and the information leakage due to this example
can be computed by:
H[[if]] = H˜(P0 ∪ P1) + H˜(Q
l
0 ∪ Q
l
1|P0 ∪ P1)
= H˜({
1
232
} ∪ {1−
1
232
}) + 0 = 7.8× 10−9
It is clear that this example just releases a little bit information to the public.
The leakage analysis result also agrees with our intuition: the possibility of h = 0
is quite low and the uncertainty of h under condition h = 0 is still big, i.e. only
small information released to the public.
• While Loop In the while loop, the distribution goes around the loop, at
each round, the part that makes test b false breaks oﬀ and exits the loop,
and the rest goes around again. Command [[while b do c]] can be rewritten as
[[if ¬b then skip else {c; while b do c}]]. The operator for loops can be de-
scribed in a recursive way, we have:⎧⎨
⎩
[[while b do c]]0(μ) = μ
[[while b do c]]n(μ) = [[¬b]](μ) + [[c]] ◦ [[b]]([[while b do c]]n−1(μ))
For the always terminating loops, the output distribution is the sum of all the
sub-distributions that fail the conditional test on each iteration and ﬁnd their way
out of the loop untill [[b]](μ) = ∅. The loop is considered as partially/completely
non-terminated when no new partitions are produced but the test is still satisﬁed
with respect to the partial/whole space. Consider a terminating loop as a sub-
measure transformer which builds a set of accumulated incomplete distributions,
i.e. due to the kth iteration, P([[while b do c]]) =
⋃
0≤i≤k Pi([[while b do c]]),
where k ≤ n, and n is the maximum number of the partitions produced by the
terminating loops. Let
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Pi = {pi} = {μ(e
i)}, where e i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
b0 = ff, i = 0
b0 = tt ∧ b1 = ff, i = 1
b0 = tt, . . . , bi−1 = tt ∧ bi = ff, i > 1
where ei is the event that the loop test b is true until the ith iteration, bi denotes
the value of the boolean test b at the ith iteration. Consider the union of the
decompositions
P = (P0 ∪ P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk)0≤k≤n = ({p0} ∪ {p1} ∪ . . . ∪ {pk})0≤k≤n
the events P0, . . . ,Pk build the out-going partitions of the states for a while loop.
The leakage computation of the loop given by addition of the entropy of the union
of the boolean test for each iteration and the sum of the entropy of the loop body
for each weighted sub-probability measures by applying the deﬁnition of entropy
of partitions [29,27]:
Lwhile(k) = H˜(P0 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk) + H˜(Q
L
0 ∪ . . . ∪ Q
L
k |P0 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk)
=
∑n
i=0(pi log2
1
pi
)∑n
i=0 pi
+
∑n
i=0
∑m
j=0 qij log2
qij
pi∑n
i=0
∑m
j=0 qij
where Pi = {pi}, thus H˜(Pi) = log2
1
pi
. The leakage computation formula works
for terminating, partially terminating, and non-terminating loops. Further details
and examples refer to [26].
3 Abstraction on Information Flow Measurement
To address the problem of tractability when the size and number of variables get
large, we present a method to help us approximate our concrete analysis for leakage.
Firstly, we deﬁne an abstraction on the measure space. The abstraction technique
considered is partitioning of the concrete measure space into blocks. Each block is
described by intervals and has a coeﬃcient which is the upper bound on measures.
Secondly, abstract semantic operations are applied on these partitions. The abstract
transformation behavior of the distributions is described by the abstract transition
function [[·]] on the abstract objects based on Monniaux’s [25] abstract probabilistic
semantics. To guarantee security, the analysis is safe if we ﬁnd an upper bound
on the leakage. Our analysis is required to over estimate the leakage and never
under estimate it. Therefore, we introduce uniformalization to estimate the abstract
spaces to provide safe bounds on the entropy computation. The leakage computation
is obtained by estimating the abstract space to maximise the entropy and thus give
safe (i.e. upper) bounds on the entropy.
3.1 Measurable Partitions and Abstract Domain
In the ﬁrst step, we aim to provide an abstraction on the measure space transfor-
mation which provides a basis for the leakage computation. The basic principle of
abstraction here is to collapse sets of concrete states into single abstract states such
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that concrete states are simulated by abstract ones. We give our basic abstract
domain expressing the above idea formally, and take Monniaux’s [25] framework of
abstract probabilistic semantics to construct abstract operations on such abstract
objects.
Our abstract domain is based on partitions of the measure space. Any collection
of non-empty disjoint sets that cover measure space X is said to be a partition of X.
A partition of space X is deﬁned as a family ξ = {Ei|i ∈ I} of nonempty disjoint
subsets of X, whose union is X:
⋃
Ei∈ξ
Ei = X. The sets Ei are the blocks of ξ.
This can be equivalently considered as a surjection φ : X → X/ξ, where the points
of the space X/ξ correspond to the sets {Ei} of the partition. An element of ξ is
the inverse image φ−1(e) of a point e ∈ X/ξ. The quotient σ-algebra on X/ξ is
deﬁned as the pushforward under φ of the σ-algebra on X, i.e. a subset M ⊂ X/ξ
is measurable if φ−1(M) ⊂ X is measurable. φ is called a measurable partition
function. Suppose we have a measure μ on X and a measurable partition ξ. The
quotient measure μ′ on X/ξ is deﬁned as the pushforward of μ under the natural
projection, i.e. for a subset M ⊂ X/ξ, deﬁne μ′(M) = μ(φ−1(M ′)).
Partitions of sets can be viewed as random variables: if X is a ﬁnite set and
ξ = {E1, . . . , En} is a partition of X, W (X) denotes the weight of X, then p =
(W (E1)
W (X) , . . . ,
W (En)
W (X) ) is a discrete probability distribution. The Shannon entropy of p
equals to the Shannon entropy of ξ according to Rokhlin [29]. This relation allows
the transfer of certain probabilistic and information-theoretical notions to partitions
of sets, where we can take advantage of the partial order between partitions.
Deﬁnition 3.1 The partial order relation on Ξ(X) is deﬁned by ξ ≤ ξ′ for ξ, ξ′ ∈
Ξ(X) if H(ξ) ≤ H(ξ′). It is easy to get that if every block of ξ is included in a block
of ξ′ then ξ ≥ ξ′.
The largest element of this lattice is the partition αX = {{x}|x ∈ X}; the least
one is the partition ωX = {X}. The set of partitions of X is denoted by Ξ(X). A
partial order relation on (Ξ(X),≤) is actually a bounded lattice.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Abstract domain) Let Iv = [av, bv], where v in X. Then let
[Ei]
def
= {Iv|v in X } be the interval-based partition of X. The abstract domain
is deﬁned as: X
def
= {〈αi, [Ei]〉}0<i≤n, where n is the number of the partitions.
A component of the abstract domain X is deﬁned as a pair 〈αi, [Ei]〉, where αi
denotes the weight on [Ei], [Ei] is a partition on concrete space X and described
by a set of intervals on possible values of each variable v in the vector of program
variables X: ∃ intervals {Iv = [av, bv]v∈ X} on partition Ei, where av = min{Val v},
bv = max{Val v}, and Valv denotes the possible values of v inside Ei.
Intuitively, a single partition is constructed by choosing an interval on possible
values for each variable. The partitions can be arbitrary, but certain human in-
tervention can optimise the analysis. All diﬀerent strategies of partitioning on the
space can produce safe leakage bounds, but with diﬀerent precision with regard
to the resulting upper bound. The abstract space can be viewed as X〈α, γ〉X,
where X denotes the concrete space, X denotes the abstract space, α denotes the
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abstraction function, and γ denotes the concretisation function as usual.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Abstraction funtion) The abstraction function α is a mapping
from concrete space X to the sets of interval-based partitions X: X
w
−→ [X/ξ] with
weights w over the interval-based partitions [X/ξ], where [X/ξ] = {〈αi, [Ei]〉}0<i≤n
(assume n is the number of the partitions).
The measurability of this collection of partitions follows from their disjointness.
However, non-injective semantics [[·]] can produce non-disjoint sets in some cases.
For the case of non-disjoint partitions created by semantic function [[·]] : X → X, we
extend the space to eliminate the collisions. The method we considered is putting
an index i on the overlapped part to distinguish them, where i is from the index of
the partition Ei in which it is located. Since the initial partitions {Ei|i ∈ I} before
semantic functions are disjoint, there exist measures μi such that
∑
μi = μ(
⋃
Ei),
and for all i, μi is concentrate on Ei and μi ≤ αi. It is clear that such scenario will
never underestimate the leakage computation due to the deﬁnition of leakage upper
bound in Deﬁnition 3.12 (see Proposition 3.15).
The concretisation of such abstract objects is thus the set of all measures match-
ing the above conditions. Consider a sub-partition η on each element of the ﬁnal
abstract space X to concretize it.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Concretisation function) The concretisation function γ is thus
a mapping: X →
⋃
{x|x ∈ [Ei/η]}, where Ei is the blocks of the abstract object X
,
η is a sub-partition on each block under uniform distribution.
The sub-partition η will be further discussed in section 3.4 for the purpose of safe
leakage computation.
Proposition 3.5 X〈α, γ〉X is a Galois connection.
Proof. For complete lattices X and X, to prove the pair 〈α, γ〉 form a Galois
connection, we need to prove that for all C ∈ X and A ∈ X, C X γ ◦ α(C) and
α ◦ γ(A) X A.
The concrete space X with measures (q1, . . . , qm) can be viewed as a composition
of two partitions denoted by: ξη0, where ξ = {E1, . . . , En} with measures μ1, . . . , μn
is the same partition as the abstraction X given by α. Sub-partition η0 is the
partition on ξ which recovers the abstract space X to be the original concrete space,
i.e. assume Nk is the number of elements of Ek (where 1 ≤ k ≤ n and therefore
m =
∑n
k=1 Nk ), according to the deﬁnition of entropy of partitions [29,27], for all
C ∈ X, we have
H(C) =H(ξη0) = H(ξ) +H(η0|ξ) = H(μ1, . . . , μn) +
n∑
i=1
μiH(
pi1
μi
, . . . ,
piNi
μi
)(1)
where p11
μ1
= q1, . . . ,
pnNn
μn
= qm is the measures over X, and m =
∑n
k=1 Nk.
The abstract space X can be viewed as a partition ξ over X given by abstraction
function α. The concretisation on Xsharp is given by sub-partition η (uniformal-
ization) on each block. Therefore γ ◦ α can be considered as the composition of
partitions ξη, i.e. for all A ∈ X, we have
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H(γ(α(A))) =H(ξη) = H(ξ) +H(η|ξ) = H(μ1, . . . , μn) +
n∑
i=1
μiH(
1
Ni
, . . . ,
1
Ni
)(2)
since uniform distribution maximise the entropy, we have
H(
1
Ni
, . . . ,
1
Ni
) ≥ H(
pi1
μi
, . . . ,
piNi
μi
) for all 0 < i ≤ n(3)
By (1)(2)(3) it is easy to get that H(C) ≤ H(γ(α(C))), and similarly
H(α(γ(A))) ≤ H(A). Therefore, C X γ ◦ α(C) and α ◦ γ(A) X A. 
3.2 Abstract Transformation
We have presented an abstract domain to approximate the concrete measure spaces.
We need abstract semantic functions to produce the transformations of such abstract
spaces. The leakage upper bound Uv on variable v will be discussed in Section 3.4.
We just concentrate on the abstract space transformation here. Assume [[·]] is
the abstract semantic function, which drives the abstract spaces to transform. For
the purpose of leakage computation, the abstract transformations are required to
keep the measurability and properties of entropy computation. We concentrate on
the abstract semantic functions over measurable partitions. It is easy to extend
to abstract transformation over interval-based measurable partitions deﬁned in our
abstract domain.
Proposition 3.6 If φ : X → X/ξ is a measurable partition function on the measur-
able space X and [[·]] is the measurable space transformation function on X given by
semantic functions, then [[·]] (the abstract analogue of [[·]]) is a measurable function
on X = φ(X).
Proof. To prove [[·]] is measurable, we need to prove that for all M ⊂ X/ξ,
[[·]]−1(M) is measurable.
[[·]]−1(M) = {x|φ([[·]](x)) ∈ M} = {x|[[·]](x) ∈ φ−1(M)}
i.e. [[·]]−1(M) is the set of all those elements of X which are mapped into M by [[·]].
Since φ is measurable, φ−1(M) is a subset of elements of X, the measurability
of the set
[[·]]−1(M) = {x|[[·]](x) ∈ φ−1(M)} = [[·]]−1(φ−1(M))
follows from the measurability of [[·]].

3.2.1 Arithmetic Expressions
In concrete analysis, we denote the probability function of variable v as μv. Let
μv(c) be the probability that the value of v is c, the domain of μv will be the set of
all possible values that v could be. The computation function e(μ) of an arithmetic
expression e deﬁnes the measure space that the arithmetic expression can evaluate
to in a given set of environments.
Now consider the abstract arithmetic operation e(x, y) = z. We deﬁne the
abstract arithmetic operation 〈αi, {[av , bv]v∈ X}i〉 → 〈α
′
i, {[a
′
v , b
′
v]v∈ X}i〉 as: z
 =
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e(x, y)(〈αi, {[av , bv]v∈ X}i〉), and for all i ∈ N , we take,
• α′i = αi
•
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
if v = z a′v = min{e(zx, zy)|ax ≤ zx ≤ bx, ay ≤ zy ≤ by}
b′v = max{e(zx, zy)|ax ≤ zx ≤ bx, ay ≤ zy ≤ by}
otherwise a′v = av, b
′
v = bv
The arithmetic expression returns the probable values on the abstract lattice with
the current context: the weight of each abstract element is unchanged, i.e. α′i = αi;
the interval of variable v is updated by the intervals on probable values of the
expression e if v suppose to be the assigned variable.
Example 3.7 Consider expression [[x+2y]], assume the initial distribution for 〈x, y〉
is μ〈x,y〉 (the distribution function on a set M is viewed as a mapping: M → [0, 1]):
μ〈x,y〉 →
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
〈0, 0〉 → 0.1, 〈1, 1〉 → 0.1, 〈2, 1〉 → 0.1 E1
−−−−−− −−−−−− −−−−−− −−−
〈3, 2〉 → 0.2, 〈4, 2〉 → 0.2, 〈5, 2〉 → 0.1
〈6, 3〉 → 0.1, 〈7, 3〉 → 0.1 E2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
• We take the partition:
⎧⎨
⎩
E1〈[0, 2]x, [0, 1]y〉 : α1 = 0.3
E2〈[3, 7]x, [2, 3]y〉 : α2 = 0.7
• Apply the arithmetic expression μ[[x+2y]], we get:
⎧⎨
⎩
E1〈[0, 4][[x+2y]]〉 : α1 = 0.3
E2〈[7, 13][[x+2y]]〉 : α2 = 0.7
3.2.2 Assignment
Assignment operation [[x := e]] updates the state such that the abstract domain of
assigned variable x is mapped to the domain of expression e. The upper bounds on
the weight of partitions remain unchanged: α′i = αi, and the interval of assigned
variable x is updated by the interval of the expression e: ax = min{Val e}, bx =
max{Val e}.
3.2.3 Sequential command
The sequential operator can be obtained by composition: [[c1; c2]]
(X) = [[c2]]
 ◦
[[c1]]
(X). Assume X′ = [[c1]](X
), and X′′ = [[c1]](X
′), then X′′ is the new state
space by executing the sequential command over X: X
[[c1;c2]]
−→ X′′.
3.2.4 Conditional
The tests split the abstract space into two parts according to the result of boolean
test over the space. The weight on each part is the probability of the part of the
space that makes the boolean test be true or false. The if statement returns the sum
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of the two parts by executing the statements under true and false branches, therefore
the intervals on variables are updated but the weight on each abstract block remains
unchanged. Let + be an abstraction of the sum operation on measures, the abstract
semantic function of tests are given by:
[[if b then c1 else c2]]
(X) [[c1]]
 ◦ [[b]](X) + [[c2]]
 ◦ [[¬b]](X)
We deﬁne the abstract operation (X,XT,XF) → X ′, where XT denotes the
abstract object under true branch: XT〈αTi , {[a
T
v , b
T
v ]v∈ X}i〉 = [[c1]]
 ◦ [[b]](X), and
XF denotes the abstract object under false branch: XF〈αFi , {[a
F
v , b
F
v ]v∈ X}i〉 =
[[c2]]
 ◦ [[¬b]](X). We have, ∀v ∈ X:
(〈αi, {[av , bv ]}i〉, 〈α
T
i , {[a
T
v , b
T
v ]}i〉, 〈α
F
i , {[a
F
v , b
F
v ]}i〉) → 〈α
′
i, {[a
′
v , b
′
v ]}i〉
for all v ∈ X , i ∈ N , we take:
• α′i = α
T
i + α
F
i = αi;
• a′v = min(a
T
v , a
F
v ), and b
′
v = max(b
T
v , b
F
v ) on each interval-based partition [Ei].
Example 3.8 Consider program
if(x==0) then y:=0 else y:=1;
Assume x is a 3-bit high security variable with distribution⎛
⎝ 0 → 0.1 1 → 0.1 2→ 0.1 3 → 0.1
4 → 0.2 5 → 0.2 6→ 0.1 7 → 0.1
⎞
⎠
y is a 3-bit low security variable under any distribution. Let us take partition
as:
⎧⎨
⎩
E1〈[0, 3]x, [0, 7]y〉 : α1 = 0.4
E2〈[4, 7]x, [0, 7]y〉 : α2 = 0.6
. After applying the abstract operation for if
statement, we have:
⎧⎨
⎩
E′1〈[0, 3]x, [0, 1]y〉 : α
′
1 = 0.4
E′2〈[4, 7]x, [1, 1]y〉 : α
′
2 = 0.6
.
3.2.5 Loops
The concrete semantics of loops are given as inﬁnite sums of all the partitions
which have found their way out in a recursive way (see Section 2.3). In order
to consider the approximation of the ﬁxpoint of some monotone operators on the
concrete lattices and study the abstract operations, we rewrite the semantic function
of loops as [[while b do c]](X) = [[¬b]](limn→∞ Xn) following [25], where Xn is deﬁned
recursively: X0 = λX.0, and Xn+1 = Xn + [[c]] ◦ [[b]](Xn). We shall deal with it
using ﬁxpoints on the abstract lattice (X,). Let us take X as the abstraction
of measure space X, assume lfp : (X
monotone
−→ X) → X is an approximation of the
least ﬁxpoint, i.e. if [[·]] : X → X is monotonic then we have the approximation
relation [[·]](lfp(f))  lfp(f). Let + be an abstraction of the sum operation on
measures, ⊥ be an abstraction of the null measure, the abstract function is given
by: [[while b do c]](X)  [[¬b]](lfp χ → X unionsq [[c]]([[b]](χ))). We deﬁne the
abstract operation: (〈αi, {[av , bv]v∈ X}i〉, 〈α
′
i, {[a
′
v , b
′
v]v∈ X}i〉) → 〈α
′′
i , {[a
′′
v , b
′′
v ]v∈ X}i〉
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as the least upper bound: 〈αi, {[av , bv]v∈ X}i〉 unionsq
 〈α′i, {[a
′
v , b
′
v]v∈ X}i〉, and ∀i ∈ N , we
take:
• α′′i = max(αi, α
′
i)
• a′′v = min(av, a
′
v), and b
′′
v = max(bv, b
′
v), for all v ∈ X on [Ei]
Furthermore, to ﬁgure out the approximation of least ﬁxpoint operation
lfp, we need an operation to be applied using widening operators ∇ to guar-
antee termination of the increasing sequences, and the feasibility of the ﬁxed
point computation. By widening, the abstract function (X,X ′) → X ′′, i.e.
(〈αi, {[av , bv ]v∈ X}i〉, 〈α
′
i, {[a
′
v , b
′
v ]v∈ X}i〉) → 〈α
′′
i , {[a
′′
v , b
′′
v ]v∈ X}i〉 can be noted as
〈αi, {[av , bv]v∈ X}i〉∇〈α
′
i, {[a
′
v , b
′
v ]v∈ X}〉 as standard. By induction, the upward it-
eration sequence is deﬁned as X′n+1 = X
′
n∇X

n as usual, which is required to be
eventually stationary for every ascending chain elements and limited by a sound
upper approximation of lfp for any sequence (Xn)n∈N . Since our abstract domain
is based on partitions of the measure space with coeﬃcients of intervals of variable
values, i.e. interval-based approximation, we choose the ordinary widening operator
for intervals on the integers ∇I [8]: x∇Iy =∞, if x < y, otherwise x∇Iy = y. The
intuition behind applying this widening operator is that if a sequence of coeﬃcients
Iv keeps ascending, an upper approximation of it is obtained by using +∞. For all
i ∈ N , we take:
• α′′i = max(αi, α
′
i)
• Intervals Iv = [av, bv ]v∈ X on [Ei] are given as standard:
⊥∇I [av, bv] = [av, bv ]
[av, bv ]∇I⊥ = [av, bv ]
[av, bv ]∇I [a
′
v , b
′
v] = if a
′
v < av then −∞ else av
if bv < b
′
v then +∞ else bv
Weight on each abstract elements is the maximum one between before and after the
current iteration. By applying the widening operation of intervals ∇I , we enforce
the convergence and induce termination for intervals on each abstract blocks.
3.3 Soundness of Abstract Functions
It is clear that, for a Galois connection, X〈α, γ〉X, and semantic functions [[·]] :
X → X, [[·]] : X → X, X is a sound approximation of X iﬀ
(α ◦X)(S) X (X
 ◦ α)(S), for all S ∈ X
iﬀ
([[·]] ◦ γ)(A) X (γ ◦ [[·]]
)(A), for all A ∈ X
Furthermore, given the Galois connection, X〈α, γ〉X, and operation [[·]] : X →
X, the most precise [[·]]
best
: X → X, which is sound with respect to [[·]] is [[·]]best =
α ◦ [[·]] ◦ γ.
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Lemma 3.9 (Soundness of composed functions) Assume function f 1 is a
sound abstraction of function f1, and f

2 is a sound abstraction of f2, then the ab-
stract composed function f 1 ◦f

2 is sound with respect to concrete composed function
f1 ◦ f2.
α ◦ f1  f

1 ◦ α ∧ α ◦ f2  f

2 ◦ α =⇒ α ◦ (f2 ◦ f1)  (f

2 ◦ f

1) ◦ α
Proof.
f 1 ◦ f

2 ◦ α  (α ◦ f
∗
1 ◦ γ) ◦ (α ◦ f
∗
2 ◦ γ) ◦ α (because α ◦ f
∗ ◦ γ  f )
= α ◦ f∗1 ◦ (γ ◦ α) ◦ f
∗
2 ◦ (γ ◦ α)  α ◦ f
∗
1 ◦ f
∗
2 (because γ ◦ α  Idc)

Theorem 3.10 (Soundness of abstract functions) [[·]] is sound with respect to
concrete semantic functions [[·]].
Proof. To show the soundness of the abstraction is equivalent to prove that [[·]] is
sound with respect to [[·]] iﬀ
[[·]]best(A) = α ◦ [[·]] ◦ γ(A) X [[·]]
(A), for all A ∈ X
• Assignment: [[x := e]] is sound with respect to [[x := e]] iﬀ [[x := e]]best =
α ◦ [[x := e]] ◦ γ X→X [[x := e]]
. Assume we concentrate on interested variable
v with interval [ai, bi], let M

e = e(X) = {〈αi, [ai, bi]〉}i∈N , we have γ(M

e) =⋃
i∈N{αi/Ni, si|ai ≤ si ≤ bi, Ni = bi − ai + 1}, then we have:
[[x := e]]best(x,M

e) (X
)
=α ◦ [[x := e]](x, γ(Me)) (X
)
=α([[x := e]](x,
⋃
i∈N
{〈αi/Ni, si〉|ai ≤ si ≤ bi, Ni = bi − ai + 1}) (X
)
=X(
⋃
i∈N
{〈αi, Ei(x → [ai, bi])〉})
 [[x := e]](x,Me) (X
) (by Proposition 3.5)
• Compositional operator The soundness proof of sequential abstract function
is straightforward by Lemma 3.9.
• Conditional To prove soundness of the abstract function for if statement, we
need to show that α ◦ [[if b then c1 else c2]]  [[if b then c1 else c2]]
 ◦ α, i.e.,
for all S ∈ X:
α([[if b then c1 else c2]])S  [[if b then c1 else c2]]
(α(S))
By Proposition 3.5, it is clear that,
α([[b]])S =
⋃
i∈N
{〈αTi , {[a
T
v , b
T
v ]v∈ X}〉}  [[b]]
(α(S)) ◦ α
α([[¬b]])S =
⋃
i∈N
{〈αFi , {[a
F
v , b
F
v ]v∈ X}〉}  [[¬b]]
(α(S)) ◦ α
By Lemma 3.9 and IH, it is easy to get that,
[[c1]] ◦ [[b]] + [[c2]] ◦ [[¬b]]  [[c1]]
 ◦ [[b]] + [[c2]]
 ◦ [[¬b]]
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• Loop To prove soundness of [[while b do c]] with respect to [[while b do c]], we
need to show α ◦ [[while b do c]]  [[while b do c]] ◦ α, i.e. for all S ∈ X
α([[while b do c]](S))  [[while b do c]](α(S))
Let F = λχ.X ∪ [[c]]([[b]]χ), and F  = λχ.X unionsq [[c]]([[b]]χ) and thus
lfp F = lfp lim
n→∞
(λχ.X ∪ [[c]]([[b]]χ))n
lfp F = lfp lim
n→∞
(λχ.X unionsq [[c]]([[b]]χ))n
Starting with ⊥, we apply the function F over and over again to build up a
sequence of partial functions F0, F1, . . . , Fn, similar to F
. By IH, we have:
(i) The base case is obvious when the function F  is applied 0 time:
α ◦ ∅  ⊥ ◦ α =⇒ α ◦ (λχ.X ∪ [[c]]([[b]]χ))0  (λχ.X unionsq [[c]]([[b]]χ))0 ◦ α
(ii) IH: Assume ∀ n < k, α ◦ Fn  F

n ◦ α
then, α ◦ Fk−1  F

k−1 ◦ α by IH (k − 1 < k)
and α ◦ F1  F

1 ◦ α by IH (1 < k)
by Lemma 3.9 and deﬁnition of Fn and F

n, we have
α ◦ (Fk−1 ◦ F1)  (F

k−1 ◦ F

1) ◦ α iﬀ α ◦ Fk  F

k ◦ α
Therefore, soundness of abstract function F  is obtained as:
α ◦ (λχ.X ∪ [[c]]([[b]]χ))n+1  (λχ.X unionsq [[c]]([[b]]χ))n+1 ◦ α
By Lemma 3.9, we have
α ◦ [[¬b]](lfp λχ.X ∪ [[c]]([[b]]χ))  [[¬b]](lfp λχ.X unionsq [[c]]([[b]]χ)) ◦ α
i.e. α([[while b c]](S))  [[while b c]](α(S)). This completes the proof of the
soundness of abstract semantic function for loops.

3.4 Entropy of Measurable Partition and Leakage Computation
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have described an abstraction on the measure space and the
abstract semantic operations. In order to measure the information ﬂow, we also need
to consider an approximation on the leakage computation. Let ξ be our measurable
partition of space X and E1, E2, . . . , En be elements of ξ of positive measure (where
n is the number of partitions), and μi such that
∑n
i=1 μi = μ(
⋃
Ei) and μi is
concentrated on Ei. The entropy of ξ is given by Rokhlin [29]: if μ(X −
⋃
Ei) =
0, H(ξ) = −
∑n
i=1 μi log2 μi; if μ(X −
⋃
Ei) > 0, H(ξ) = +∞. H(ξ) is called the
entropy of ξ.
We have introduced that if ξ, ξ′ ∈ Ξ(X) and ξ ≤ ξ′, then H(ξ) ≤ H(ξ′). How-
ever, the partition entropy may underestimate the leakage computation. To get
a conservative leakage analysis, we need a re-approximation on the ﬁnal abstract
space aimed to provide a safe (upper) bound on the leakage computation at the end.
The basic method here is that we do a subpartition η on each element of the ﬁnal
abstract objects obtained by the abstract operations to maximise entropy. The sub-
partition we considered is performing a uniformalization over each element of the
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ﬁnal partition ξ′ = [[·]]ξ according to the fact that uniform distribution maximises
entropy. We call a block uniform if all its states inside have the same probability,
i.e. all possible values of the distribution within that block are uniform.
Deﬁnition 3.11 (Uniformalization) Uniformalization is deﬁned as a transfor-
mation of each block of space of a variable into a space with uniform distribution
on each block, i.e. each partition is sub-partitioned under uniform distribution due
to the values of an interested (low) variable.
Based on the deﬁnition of uniformalization on measurable partitions, next con-
sider the leakage upper bound Uv due to our abstract domain. Let us consider a
subpartition η under uniform distribution on the ﬁnal partition ξ′ in which any ele-
ment E′i ∈ ξ
′ comprises of Ni sub-elements with equal probability (where [[·]]ξ = ξ
′,
and ξ is the initial partition at the begin of the program), and let us attach to this
partition the ﬁnite discrete uniform probability distribution whose corresponding
entropy will be log2(Ni), where Ni denotes the size of the ﬁnal abstract element E
′
i
due to the low security variable considered. We consider the entropy of the compo-
sition of partitions ξ′ and η denoted by H(ξ′η), which is deﬁned as the sum of the
well-deﬁned entropy H(ξ′) and the mean conditional entropy of η with respect to
ξ′: H(η|ξ′) [29], i.e.
H(ξ′η) = H(ξ′) +H(η|ξ′)
The conditional entropy H(η|ξ′) is a non-negative measurable function on the factor
space X/ξ, which is deﬁned by [29]: H(η|ξ′) =
∑n
i=1 μiH(η), where μi denotes
the measure of each partition given by ξ′. The leakage upper bound is therefore
deﬁned as the entropy on the compositional partitions ξ′η. It is clear that the
entropy of a measurable sub-partition η on partition of ξ′ into Ni sets is less than
or equal to log2(Ni) if and only if every element of the sub-partition has measure
1/Ni. This meets the intuition of our method: computation time is saved by doing
abstract transformations on abstract partitions ξ of the measure space, the safety
of the leakage computation is guaranteed by considering mean conditional entropy
of uniform partition η with respect to the ﬁnal abstract partition ξ′ returned by the
execution of the program.
Deﬁnition 3.12 (Leakage upper bound) The leakage upper bound is given by
the entropy of paritition ξ′η, according to the deﬁnition of entropy on partitions and
deﬁnitions of ξ′ and η, we have:
Uv =H(ξ
′η) = H(ξ′) +H(η|ξ′)
=H(μ1, . . . , μn) +
n∑
i=1
μiH(
μi/Ni
μi
, . . . ,
μi/Ni
μi
)
=H(μ1, . . . , μn) +
n∑
i=1
μiH(
1
Ni
, . . . ,
1
Ni
)
=H(μ1, . . . , μn) +
n∑
i=1
μi log2(Ni)
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where Ni is the size of the partition Ei, i.e. Ni = (bv − av +1) for partition Ei ∈ ξ
′.
Example 3.13 Consider [[l := h+ 1]] as an example to show some intuition of the
method. Assume the initial distribution of h is
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 → 0.3 2→ 0.4
3 → 0.1 4→ 0.1
5 → 0.1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠, and the dis-
tribution of l is
⎛
⎝ 0 → 0.5
1 → 0.5
⎞
⎠. Consider the partitions ξ1 on the joint distribu-
tion:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
E1〈[1, 1]h, [0, 1]l〉 : α1 = 0.3
E2〈[2, 2]h, [0, 1]l〉 : α2 = 0.4
E3〈[3, 5]h, [0, 1]l〉 : α3 = 0.3
. The abstract semantic functions transform
the above abstract objects into ξ′1:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
E′1〈[1, 1]h, [2, 2]l〉 : α
′
1 = 0.3
E′2〈[2, 2]h, [3, 3]l〉 : α
′
2 = 0.4
E′3〈[3, 5]h, [4, 6]l〉 : α
′
3 = 0.3
. In the next step,
we perform uniformalization on ξ′1, and concentrate on the low security variable l:
ξ′1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
[2, 2]l → 0.3
[3, 3]l → 0.4
[4, 6]l → 0.3
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ Uniformalization=⇒ ξ′1η1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 → 0.3/1
3 → 0.4/1
4 → 0.3/3
5 → 0.3/3
6 → 0.3/3
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Finally we do the leakage computation due to such spaces based on the leakage
deﬁnition: the leakage upper bound Ul = H(0.3, 0.4, 0.3) + 0.3 ∗ log2 3 = 2.0464.
In order to show that the strategy of partitioning aﬀect the precision of
leakage computation, let us consider another strategy way of partitions ξ2:⎧⎨
⎩
E1〈[1, 3]h, [0, 1]l〉 : α1 = 0.8
E2〈[4, 5]h, [0, 1]l〉 : α2 = 0.2
. The abstract semantic functions transform the
above abstract objects into ξ′2:
⎧⎨
⎩
E1〈[1, 3]h, [2, 4]l〉 : α1 = 0.8
E2〈[4, 5]h, [5, 6]l〉 : α2 = 0.2
. After doing uni-
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formalization, we have:
ξ′2
⎛
⎝ [2, 4]l → 0.8
[5, 6]l → 0.2
⎞
⎠ Uniformalization=⇒ ξ′2η2
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 → 0.8/3
3 → 0.8/3
4 → 0.8/3
5 → 0.2/2
6 → 0.2/2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and the leakage upper bound of variable l is given by:
Ul = H(0.8, 0.2) + 0.8× log2 3 + 0.2 × log2 2 = 2.1899
Furthermore, it is easy to get that the exact leakage due to this simple example
is L = H(0.3, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) = 2.0464. This simple example suggests that unifor-
malization on abstract objects preserves the safety of leakage computations, and the
strategy of partition may aﬀect the precision of the computation: the ﬁrst strategy
of partition in this example is much better than the second one since the ﬁrst one
is closer to the exact leakage. But both of them provide safe leakage computation,
i.e. never underestimate the leakage analysis. The precision of partitioning strategy
depends on the initial distribution of high security inputs and also the programs,
but not in general. One can image that the analyzer can produce more precise result
if the partitions produced by the partitioning strategy and abstract operations in
the abstract lattice is closer to the concrete partitions produced by the programs
(especially conditional tests and loops) in the concrete lattice.
Example 3.14 Consider a loop program
l:=0; while(l<h) do l++;
assume h is a 3-bit high security variable with distribution
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 → 0.1, 1→ 0.1
2 → 0.1, 3→ 0.1
4 → 0.2, 5→ 0.2
6 → 0.1, 7→ 0.1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, l
is a 3-bit low security variable with an initial value of 0. Let us take partition ξ as:⎧⎨
⎩
E1〈[0, 3]h, [0, 0]l〉 : α1 = 0.4
E2〈[4, 7]h, [0, 0]l〉 : α2 = 0.6
. According to the above abstract operation, we can
get that,
• α′1 = 0.4, [ah, bh] = [0, 3], [al, bl] = [0, 3]
• α′2 = 0.6, [ah, bh] = [4, 7], [al, bl] = [0, 7]
Finally we compute the entropy of y by leakage deﬁnition after uniformalization:
leakage upper bound Ul = H(0.4, 0.6) + 0.4 ∗ log2 4 + 0.6 ∗ log2 8 = 3.57. That is of
course not as good as the exact computation:
L = H(0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1) = 2.92
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but still oﬀers a reasonable upper bound. This example also shows our abstraction
techniques improves the time consuming problem of leakage analysis. Note that the
concrete analysis needs 8 time-unit(iteration) to get the result while the abstract
analysis needs 2 units.
The measurement produced by our technique should be an upper bound on the
actual information ﬂow, so that our technique can overestimate the amount of infor-
mation leaked, but can never underestimate it. To address this concern, Proposition
3.15 is presented to show the soundness of our approximation for abstract leakage
analysis formally.
Proposition 3.15 Assume the ﬁnal abstract space obtained by the semantic func-
tions [[·]] be a ﬁnite measurable partition ξ. After performing uniformalization sub-
partition η on these output abstract objects ξ, we get safe leakage upper bound by
computing the entropy of ξη.
Proof. Consider a distribution μ over a set of events E containing N elements and
let ξ = {E1, . . . , En} be the partitions of this set, η be a sub-partition on ξ. Assume
Nk is the number of elements of Ek, we have N =
∑n
k=1 Nk, and let μ(Ek) be the
weight of the partition Ek(k = 1, . . . , n). Let the elements of E be labeled from 1
to N , i.e. E = {e1, . . . , eN} and the elements of Ek(k = 1, . . . , n) be labeled from
1 to Nk. According to the deﬁnition of entropy of partitions [29,28], the entropy of
such space over E can be computed by:
H(ξη) =H(ξ) +H(η|ξ) = H(μ1, . . . , μn) +
n∑
i=1
μiH(
μi1
μi
, . . . ,
μiNi
μi
)
Now consider that the η is under uniform distribution over each element of
partition ξ, since the number of elements in partition Ek is Nk, the entropy of the
space after uniformalization on the partitions can be computed by:
H¯(ξη) =H(μ1, . . . , μn) +
n∑
i=1
μiH(
1
Ni
, . . . ,
1
Ni
)
Since uniform distribution maximum entropy, it is clear that
n∑
i=1
H(
1
Ni
, . . . ,
1
Ni
) ≥
n∑
i=1
H(
μi1
μi
, . . . ,
μiNi
μi
)
Therefore we get H¯(ξη) ≥ H(ξη), i.e. we show that uniformalization on the
partitions keeps the entropy computation safe. 
We have already introduced a method to provide an approximation analysis of
our automatic leakage analysis system presented at [26]. The method produces safe
leakage bounds on variables to address the scalability problem of concrete leakage
analysis.
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4 Related Work
Quantitative information ﬂow has recently become an active research topic in the
computer security community. The precursor for this work was that of Denning
in the early 1980’s. Denning [10] presented that the data manipulated by a pro-
gram can be typed with security levels, which naturally assumes the structure of a
partially ordered set. Moreover, this partially ordered set is a lattice under certain
conditions [9]. However, he did not suggest how to automate the analysis. In 1987,
Millen [24] ﬁrst built a formal correspondence between non-interference and mutual
information, and established a connection between Shannon’s information theory
and state-machine models of information ﬂow in computer systems. Later related
work is that of McLean and Gray and McIver and Morgan in 1990’s. McLean pre-
sented a very general Flow Model in [23], and also gave a probabilistic deﬁnition
of security with respect to ﬂows of a system based on this ﬂow model. The main
weakness of this model is that it is too strong to distinguish between statistical
correlation of values and casual relationships between high and low object. It is
also diﬃcult to be applied to real systems. Gray presented a less general and more
detailed elaboration of McLean’s ﬂow model in [15], making an explicit connection
with information theory through his deﬁnition of the channel capacity of ﬂows be-
tween conﬁdential and non-conﬁdential variables. Webber [32] deﬁned a property
of n-limited security, which took ﬂow-security and speciﬁcally prevented downgrad-
ing unauthorized information ﬂows. Wittbold and Johnson [33] gave an analysis
of certain combinatorial theories of computer security from information-theoretic
perspective and introduced non-deducibility on strategies due to feedback. Gavin
Lowe [19] measured information ﬂow in CSP by counting refusals. Aldini and Di
Pierro [1] introduced a method of quantifying information ﬂow on a probabilistic
process system, The method is based on process similarity relation with regard to
an approximation of weak bisimulation of CCS. Backes [2] gave a deﬁnition for mea-
suring the quantity of information ﬂow within interactive settings by measuring the
distance between diﬀerent behaviours of high user from low user’s views. McIver
and Morgan [22] devised a new information theoretic deﬁnition of information ﬂow
and channel capacity. They added demonic non-determinism as well as probabilis-
tic choice to while program thus deriving a non-probabilistic characterization of the
security property for a simple imperative language. There are some other attempts
in the 2000s: Di Pierro, Hankin and Wiklicky [11,12,13] gave a deﬁnition of prob-
abilistic measures on ﬂows in a probabilistic concurrent constraint system where
the interference came via probabilistic operators. Clarkson et al. [7] suggested a
probabilistic beliefs-based approach to non-interference. This work might not works
for most of situations. Diﬀerent attackers have diﬀerent beliefs, therefore the worst
case is required. Boreale [3] studied the quantitative models of information leakage
in the process calculi. Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [4,5,6] presented a more complete
reasonable quantitative analysis for a particular program in imperative languages
but the bounds for loops are over pessimistic. Malacaria [20] gave a more precise
quantitative analysis of loop construct but it is hard to automate. McCamant and
Ernst [21] investigated techniques for quantifying information ﬂow revealed by com-
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plex programs by building ﬂow graphs and considering the weight of the maximum
ﬂow over it. Ko¨pf and Basin [16] developed a quantitative model for assessing a
system’s vulnerability to adaptive side-channel attacks.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
We aimed to develop automatic and high quality leakage analysis tools for programs.
In [26], we devised a method that implements Kozen’s [18] concrete probabilistic
semantics, and applied this semantics to calculate leakage. In this paper, we present
an approach to provide an approximation on such leakage analysis.
We are currently integrating the abstraction techniques into our implementation
of concrete leakage analysis tool. We also expect to improve our analysis based on
the experimental results of the inﬂuence of certain parameters over the quality
of approximation. We propose to incorporate more parameters to obtain a better
approximation result, especially due to the time complexity issues introduced by the
calculation of mutual information. Another possible plan is to produce an abstract
backward analysis for quantitative information ﬂow. The idea is that we start from
a description of an output event, and compute back to the description of the input
domains describing their distribution of making the behavior happen. This allows
the eﬀective computation of upper bounds on the probability of outcomes of the
program. Furthermore, it is necessary to attack the problem of computation expense
of mutual information. We consider to develop a chopped information ﬂow graph for
representing information ﬂow of program by capturing and modeling the information
ﬂow of data tokens on data slice. Smith [31] introduced a new foundation based on
a concept of vulnerability recently, which measures uncertainty by applying Re´nyi’s
min-entropy rather than Shannon entropy. Our method is based on probability
distribution, we may also consider to adapt our method to diﬀerent information
theoretic measures as Smith’s [31] deﬁnition.
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